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EVIDENCE: THE TREND TOWARDS ADMISSIBILITY
JAMES E. BECKLEY*
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit broke no new
ground in the field of evidence during its 1977-78 term, nor was it
presented with any innovative attempts to expand the range of such
rules as Rule 803(24)1 or Rule 804(b)(5),2 the hearsay exception catch-
als. One opinion in the antitrust field, United States v. International
Harvester,3 represents further acceptance of the General Dynamics de-
fense to section 7 Clayton Act' cases. In another case, the court struck
down a Wisconsin statute6 which excluded all psychiatric evidence of-
fered to show a defendant's lack of capacity to form an intent in order
to rebut a Wisconsin presumption that every person intends the proba-
ble consequences of his acts.7 The most frequently litigated issue dur-
ing the past year involved the admission of evidence of similar acts in
criminal prosecutions.'
EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR ACTS AND CHARACTER
One of the most troublesome aspects of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence is presented by the use of Rule 404(b) in criminal prosecutions.
That rule distinguishes between evidence of character and evidence of
intent, pattern, or other elements of the crime alleged. It provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.9
* Partner, Roan & Grossman; B.A., Rockhurst College, Kansas City, Mo.; J.D., North-
western University. Mr. Beckley has written and lectured on Federal Civil Procedure and Evi-
dence for the Practicing Law Institute and the Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education.
1. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) (1975).
2. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) (1975).
3. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
4. United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
6. Wis. STAT. § 971.175 (1975).
7. Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 70-74
ifra.
8. See text accompanying notes 9-53 infra.
9. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (1975).
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This statute means, in effect, that such evidence generally is admissible
on any issue other than propensity or disposition to commit the offense
charged.'° Since such evidence is available to prove many of the rele-
vant issues appearing in criminal cases, but unavailable to prove the
ultimate conclusion, courts employ "limiting instructions" to apprise
juries of the difference between the two uses. An example of the typi-
cal limiting instruction used in a Rule 404(b) case is found in United
States v. Miller.1 In that case the jury was instructed that the defend-
ant's false loan applications "are not exhibits which are in any way
relevant to the guilt or innocence of the offense charged. They are
admitted solely limited to the question of intention, knowledge, and
credibility. They have no weight in the manner used or the guilt or
innocence for the Defendant on the substantial charge."' 2
Whether a jury of laymen is able to make this distinction is open
to question.' 3 Of course, if a jury is unable to perform accurately the
subtle task demanded of it by a Rule 404(b) limiting instruction, the
defendant confronted by evidence of other acts may be deprived of a
fair trial. The problems inherent in a confusing instruction, which at-
tempts to distinguish between evidence of character and evidence of
any other relevant issue, might be lessened by a strict requirement that
"other acts" be substantially similar to the offense charged.14  But the
expanded notion of relevance found in Rule 401 ' gives the trial court
vast scope, and prejudice must substantially outweigh the probative
value of the evidence to warrant exclusion. 16  To insure fair trials,
therefore, evidence of other acts must be carefully balanced against the
notion of prejudice enunciated in Rule 403.17
10. J. WALTZ, THE NEW FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 34 (1973).
11. 573 F.2d 388 (7th Cit. 1978).
12. Id. at 393-94.
13. Note, The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness d Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264, 281-88
(1966) [hereinafter cited as The Limiting Instruction].
14. See United States v. Grabiec, 563 F.2d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 1977) (Swygert, J., dissenting).
See also White, Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Under Federal Rule ofEvidence 404(b):
Some Unanswered Questions, 21 ATLA L. REP. 117 (1978).
15. FED. R. EVID. 401 (1975).
16. United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000 (3d Cir. 1976).
17. FED. R. EvtD. 403 provides, in relevant part:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
See Dolan, Rule 403, The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 220 (1976). Rule 403
was used in United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1977) to exclude relevant evidence
helpful to the defendant's case, and the "broad discretion" available to the trial court was relied
on by the Seventh Circuit to affirm. 565 F.2d at 115.
EVIDENCE
In most instances of Rule 404(b) evidence reviewed by the Seventh
Circuit during 1977-78, the trial court was not faced with great dissimi-
larities between the acts offered in evidence and the act for which the
defendant was indicted. It is arguable, therefore, that most of these
defendants' trials were not genuinely prejudiced by the admission of
this evidence.'" In Miller, for instance, the defendant had appealed
from a conviction of falsifying loan applications to an F.D.I.C.-insured
institution. The defendant had made multiple pledges of his stock in a
newly-formed bank in order to obtain loans totalling $78,350 from
three other banks. When stock certificates pledged as collateral for a
$42,000 loan to the first of the three banks were not delivered after the
first loan was made, the defendant obtained reissuance of the shares by
signing an affidavit that the shares had been lost in the mail, were
otherwise not pledged in other loan transactions, and that the only loan
for which the shares had been pledged as collateral was the one to the
first bank.
In the course of the trial, the Government introduced two financial
statements which had been submitted with loan applications to the
other two banks.'9 Both were filled out by the defendant on December
7, 1974, but several answers to questions on one application differed
from answers to the same questions on the other form. Sums given for
total assets differed by over $117,000. The court rejected the defend-
ant's argument that admission of the two statements was improper be-
cause any relevance was outweighed by prejudice.
The court found support for its holding in United States v.
Kaufman,20 where the defendant was impeached with a false entry on a
tax return. Kaufman, a process server, was charged with falsely mak-
ing affidavits representing that the intended recipients of process were
in military service. Kaufman's defense was that he had not intended
to deceive anyone and did not know the statements were false. On
cross-examination, the Government introduced the process server's in-
come tax return, which contained a false statement. Judge Anderson's
majority opinion for the Second Circuit stated that "evidence that the
defendant had signed false legal documents relating to his own per-
sonal affairs was relevant to rebut his testimony in which he character-
18. Claims of prejudice arising from characteristics incidental to documentary evidence but
which implied "other acts" were rejected in United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978) (Photographs of one defendant and a photograph of a
palm print of his co-defendant carried identification marks from the FBI and a local sheriffs
office.).
19. 573 F.2d at 392.
20. 453 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1971).
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ized himself as . . . beguiled . . into unknowingly signing false
affidavits."'"
In Miller, the Seventh Circuit justified admission of Miller's two
loan applications on the ground that:
here the false statements, which were made to two banks in the
course of loan transactions, are more closely related to the present
offense of swearing a false affidavit to a bank concerning a loan than
were the tax returns in Kaufman to the offense of false affidavits con-
erning the service of process. Moreover, the fact that one of the
three potentially false statements was made to the Anthony Wayne
Bank may make that statement even more relevant than the other
two because it indicates the defendant's way of dealing with the same
people and in the same transaction as involved in the affidavit that
prompted the indictment.22
Whatever the relevance, the trial court in Miller nevertheless was faced
with the problem of preventing the jury from using evidence of the
other false loan applications for any purpose but that contemplated by
Rule 404(b). The problems inherent in 404(b) limiting instructions are
illustrated by the Seventh Circuit's comments on the trial court's in-
struction.3 The court found the instruction to be hopelessly contradic-
tory and suggested that simply using the language of Rule 404(b)
would have been preferable. 24  In addition, it found the standard in-
struction suggested by Devitt & Blackmar almost as confusing. The
Devitt & Blackmar instruction states, "The fact that the accused may
have committed an offense at some time is not any evidence or proof
whatever that, at a later time, the accused committed the offense
charged in the indictment, even though both offenses are of a like na-
ture."25
Nonetheless, even an instruction based on the language of Rule
404(b) offers little protection to the defendant from the inevitable
prejudice which results from the admission of evidence of other crimes
or wrongful acts. The prejudice has two sources. First is the tendency
of jurors to brand the accused as an incorrigible. Second is the ten-
dency to infer that because the accused has committed other crimes, he
21. Id. at 311.
22. 573 F.2d at 393. Miller also objected to introduction of the two applications on the basis
that the information on neither document was proved false. The court rejected defendant's "no
proof of falsity" argument since Rule 404(b) does not require that the statements be proven false
in order for them to be admissible to prove intent. In the court's view, "the addition of the words
'or acts' demonstrates an intention to include within the coverage of Rule 404(b) items such as the
financial statements here." Id. at 392. The court is silent as to how a neutral, or "non-false"
document could be relevant to the Government's case.
23. See 573 F.2d at 393-94.
24. 573 F.2d at 394.
25. DEvrrr & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INsTRUCIONS, § 14.14 (3d ed.
1977) (emphasis added).
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committed the one with which he is charged. 6 Even in cases where
the prosecution introduces evidence of other wrongs greatly different
from the crime alleged and a limiting instruction is given, it is unlikely
that juries have been appropriately guided.27
Evidence of "other wrongs" somewhat more removed in time, if
not type, from the crime alleged, was in issue in United States v.
Weidman.21 There, the defendant, the president of Walsh Construc-
tion Company, knew he would be confronted with evidence of other
wrongful acts. Weidman attempted to avoid their introduction by not
raising intent as an issue of his case, but denied that he even committed
the acts alleged. Nevertheless, he was convicted on fourteen counts of
mail fraud and one count of pejury for activity arising out of Walsh's
contract with Bethlehem Steel at Burns Harbor, Indiana. The prosecu-
tion had introduced evidence of allegedly fraudulent activities by
Walsh's personnel on four earlier construction contracts. Weidman
objected to the introduction of this evidence as irrelevant. The Sev-
enth Circuit29 reasoned that, although intent was not part of the de-
fendant's case, it was crucial to the Government's case. Furthermore,
the court found that the four prior schemes were virtually identical in
detail to the one for which Weidman was indicted. ° Additionally, the
four schemes provided evidence of a pre-existing plan -- essential to the
prosecution in light of Weidman's utter denial of having committed the
act alleged. Thus, the evidence was deemed admissable, and the con-
viction was affirmed.
26. See 7he Limiting Instruction, supra note 13.
27. 70 YALE L.J. 763, 777 n.89 (1961). It is equally unlikely that the jury in United States v.
Alpern, 564 F.2d 755 (7th Cir. 1977) could have performed the mental gymnastics there asked of
it. Alpern involved a prosecution of several defendants on a charge of conspiring to bomb a
tavern. Peters, one of the defendants, argued that he had been unfairly prejudiced because a
government witness testified that a second defendant, Baker, had asked for Peters' telephone
number, dialed the number and asked a party addressed as "Pete" to come by and pick up some
dynamite Baker was holding for the co-conspirator. The trial court instructed the jury not to
consider the conversation on the issue of whether Peters was a member of the conspiracy. The
court of appeals held that the conversation was so highly probative of Baker's participation that its
relevance outweighed prejudice to Peters.
The lack of choices available to the courts of appeals in criminal cases-affirmance or rever-
sal--combined with the need to conserve judicial resources, produces a reluctance to reverse ex-
cept where prejudice constitutes almost "plain error." Substantial justice could be served by
granting courts of appeal statutory authority to grant partial remittitur of sentence where prejudice
is demonstrable but not at the level of plain error.
28. 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1978).
29. Judges Bauer, Sprecher, and Senior District Judge Campbell (sitting by designation).
30. Contra, United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1978). In Benedetto the Sec-
ond Circuit held that it was error to admit evidence of similar bribes of a federal meat inspector
on trial for accepting a particular bribe when the defendant's intent was not at issue. The convic-
tion, however, was affirmed on other grounds.
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United States v. Grabiec3" probably sets the outer limit for "other
acts" evidence in the Seventh Circuit, and demonstrates the potential
for prejudice in multiple-defendant cases where the Government seeks
to introduce "other act" evidence. The case involved a defendant con-
victed of conspiracy to extort money under color of official right 2 from
employees of Crown Personnel, Inc. Crown Personnel had provided
strike-breakers to Honeywell Company during an eight week strike,
but had not complied with an Illinois statute requiring written notice of
a labor dispute to the job applicants. The striking union filed a com-
plaint charging Crown with violating the Illinois notice statute. Gra-
biec's co-defendant Wall, a former superintendent of the Division of
Private Employment Agencies, held an informal hearing on the com-
plaint in the course of which Crown Personnel admitted its violation.
The union demanded revocation of Crown's license. Wall took the
matter under advisement pending discussion with defendant Grabiec.
At trial, William Organ, the owner of another private employment
agency, testified that he had played golf with the defendant Grabiec
several days after the first hearing on the union's charges, and that dur-
ing the game Grabiec had told Organ that something could be done to
help Crown for the sum of $1,500 to $2,000. Organ related the de-
mands to Crown's president, who stated that Crown was willing to pay
$700. Wall rejected that amount. After further negotiations, a figure
of $2,500 was agreed upon, and this money was delivered to Wall by a
third party on behalf of Crown. As part of the quidpro quo, Crown
received a token penalty which was never enforced.
In the course of the prosecution, two other witnesses, who also op-
erated employment agencies, testified over Grabiec's objection, con-
cerning offenses involving Wall. One witness testified that he had paid
$200 to Wall's bagman Moran in September 1970 in order to obtain a
license; the other testified that he also paid $200 in January 1973 to
Moran for acquisition of a license from Wall's office. Moran, testify-
ing under immunity, corroborated both witnesses' testimony. He also
testified to two payoffs he himself had made to Wall in connection with
obtaining licenses for his own employment agencies, one in 1969 and
one in 1972. The defendant argued that the admission of similar oc-
currence testimony was reversible error since the prior offenses were
wholly independent of the offense charged.33
31. 563 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1977).
32. Defendant Grabiec was a former Director of the Illinois Department of Labor.
33. 563 F.2d at 317.
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The court of appeals ruled that two of the license payoffs occurred
during the course of the conspiracy alleged by the Government and,
therefore, were not independent acts. The 1969 and 1970 transactions
also were ruled to be admissible to show a pattern of conduct. The
trial court gave essentially the same instruction given in Miller,3 4 with
the additional injunction that evidence against Grabiec's co-defendant
Wall could not be considered against Grabiec.
Judge Swygert, in his dissent, strongly objected to the admission of
the four criminal acts on the basis of "their flimsy similarity"35 to the
crime alleged. The four transactions, he argued, had nothing to do
with Grabiec, only Wall, and only then in connection with applications
for licenses-not fraudulent adjudications of complaints. Judge
Swygert stated that "[the] only claim to similarity is their extortive na-
ture and an involvement by one of the alleged conspirators. 36 He also
found that the instruction "limiting" consideration of the previous
bribes to Wall "[was] merely a conscience-saving technique [with] little
or no pragmatic value."3 7 Judge Swygert concluded:
I entertain the view that all too often, as in this case, the prosecution
has been given carte blanche to introduce evidence of pror criminal
conduct under the rubric that though such evidence is irrelevant,
nonetheless it may be admitted to show intent, motive, design, etc.,
when upon strict analysis either the prior conduct is not similar to
that charged or there is really no issue which makes the evidence
relevant. It seems to me that we have tended to forget the salutary
justification for the exclusionary part of the rule and that it is in dan-
ger of being obliterated by the exceptions.
38
34. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
35. 563 F.2d at 320.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 321.
38. Id. (citation omitted). The problem enunciated by Judge Swygert is partially met in the
Seventh Circuit by the requirement that "other crimes or acts" be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
The Fifth Circuit has developed a rather cautious rubric to be applied in Rule 404(b) situa-
tions, which would avoid Judge Swygert's criticism. This approach is set forth in United States v.
Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) where the court stated:
Because the risk of prejudice is so great, we have held that there are two conditions that
must be satisfied before evidence of other crimes may be admitted. First, the threshold
prerequisites to admission must be met. There [sic] are:
(1) Proof of other similar crimes must be plain, clear and convincing.
(2) The other crimes must not be too remote in time from the charged offense.
(3) The evidence of other crimes must be introduced for a purpose sanctioned by
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(4) The element of the charged offense that the evidence of other crimes is intro-
duced to prove must be a material issue in the case.
(5) There must be a substantial need for the probative value of the evidence of the
other crimes. (citations omitted)
Moreover, the probative value of the evidence of other crimes must outweigh the
prejudice to the defendant that may result from its admission. (citations omitted) This
balancing is largely committed to the sound discretion of the district court.
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Judge Swygert's wary view of "other act" evidence prevailed in
United States v. Shapiro,39 where the court ruled that the trial court
had abused its discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes pursu-
ant to Rule 609(b).4 In that case, the defendant was an eighty-year-
old man who had been convicted of bankruptcy, fraud and income tax
evasion thirty-eight and twenty-four years prior to his indictment for
kiting $687,335 in overdraft checks. In oral argument before the court,
the Government conceded that it was concerned that the defendant had
a grandfatherly appearance and, thus, might appear blameless to the
jury. The court of appeals reversed, stating, "[While] arguing that the
evidence [of prior convictions] had bearing on veracity, the Govern-
ment sought to have the evidence admitted to prejudice the defendant
by coloring the jury's idea of the type of person he was."'" Judge
Swygert, writing for the majority, continued, ". . .[I]n view of the simi-
larity between the prior convictions and the charged offense, the risk of
unfair prejudice was especially great."42 Judge Campbell43 suggested
in his dissent that the court's ruling "interferes with the discretionary
powers of the district court in ruling on evidentiary matters"" and that
the ruling "tends to create inflexibility in the application of Rule
609(b)."45 There was no evidence that the Government had given the
requisite notice of intent to utilize superannuated convictions, or that
550 F.2d at 1044-45.
That risk of prejudice was quantified by Kalven and Zeisel, and fully justifies the careful
application of Rule 404(b) used by the Fifth Circuit. Kalven and Zeisel demonstrated the severe
impact that knowledge of a defendant's prior convictions has on a jury. In cases in which the
defendant's prior convictions were known and the prosecution's case was contradictory, the ac-
quittal rate was 38 percent compared with 65 percent in cases where the jury had no knowledge of
prior convictions. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160 (1966).
39. 565 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1977). The Seventh Circuit has given broad scope to the "dishon-
esty or false statements" language of Rule 609(a)(2). United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827 (7th
Cir. 1972). In Papa the defendant was convicted of attempting to collect a debt by extortion after
a trial in which he had been impeached with evidence of a misdemeanor conviction for theft of
under $100 from a savings and loan. The trial court held that even though fraud or deceit is not
an element of the prior offense, the conviction may be introduced if the proponent shows that the
underlying facts included a misrepresentation or false statement. 560 F.2d at 846-48.
40. FED. R. EVID. 609(b) (1975) provides:
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than 10
years has elapsed since the date of the conviction, or of the release of the witness from
the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the conviction sup-
ported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect.
owever, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity
to contest the use of such evidence.
41. 565 F.2d at 481.
42. Id.
43. Judge Campbell was sitting by designation.
44. 565 F.2d at 481.
45. Id.
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the trial court had even attempted to make the findings on the record
urged by Judge Bauer in United States v. Mahone.46
The opposite situation arose in People ex rel Rooney v.
Housewright,47 where evidence of a victim's other acts would have
been admissible under Rule 404(2)48 to demonstrate his reputation for
violent acts. However, the defendant was tried in an Illinois court, and
Illinois law forbids introduction of evidence of a murder victim's repu-
tation for a violent and dangerous disposition unless the defendant
proves that the victim was the aggressor.
Rooney was convicted of the murder of the estranged husband of
his girl friend, a Mrs. Sarro. Rooney had driven Mrs. Sarro home after
a date. They were confronted about 2:00 a.m. by the husband,
"Stormey" Harvill. Harvill stuck his head into Rooney's car and
shouted, "I'll kill you, I'll kill you, I'll kill you both." Rooney sent
Mrs. Sarro into the house to call the police. As she left the car, she
gave him a .45 caliber revolver which she kept in her purse. Rooney
got out of the car, gun in hand. Harvill retreated to a comer of the
house. Rooney took one shot at him, then fired several more into the
air as Harvill ran away. Rooney started to follow Mrs. Sarro into the
house, then turned and looked around the corner of the house to find
Harvill coming back, crouched near the house wall. Rooney could not
see Harvill's hands. When Harvill took several steps toward Rooney,
Rooney fired three times. Harvill died at the scene of the shooting.
49
At trial Rooney attempted to introduce evidence of Harvill's repu-
tation for violence. However, he was not allowed to testify that he
knew that Harvill habitually carried a gun, that Harvill had been ar-
rested and had pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed weapon, or that
he had been questioned as a suspect in one murder case and charged
with murder in yet another. The trial court rejected not only Rooney's
testimony but the offer of testimony to the same effect from two local
law enforcement officials and a newspaper reporter. The basis for the
ruling was the exclusion under Illinois law of evidence of a victim's
46. It is apparently sufficient in the Seventh Circuit for the trial court to hear argument on
the nature of the prior conviction, possible prejudice to defendant if it was admitted, and the
proper procedure to be followed for its admission under Rule 609, without making an express
finding that prejudice is outweighed by relevance. United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922,928-29
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025 (1977). Nevertheless, such findings are strongly recom-
mended "to avoid the unnecessary raising of the issue." Id. at 929. Failure to make express
findings on the record when superannuated convictions are offered does constitute prejudicial
error in the Second Circuit. United States v. Mahler, 579 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1978). But see,
United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
47. 568 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. FED. R. EVID. 404(2) (1975).
49. 568 F.2d at 518.
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reputation for violence unless it can be inferred that the use of unlawful
force by the victim was imminent or that the defendant believed that
his use of force was necessary to prevent physical harm to himself. In
Rooney, the Seventh Circuit50 found the evidence of guilt "overwhelm-
ing" and concluded that any error was harmless." Judge Wood, writ-
ing for the majority, held that there was an absolute failure of proof on
the issue of threat to Rooney, and that, therefore, Rooney was not enti-
tled to introduce evidence of Harvill's violent reputation. 2
Judge Pell, in a dissenting opinion, stated that Harvill's reputation
was highly relevant to the defendant's reasonable belief that he was in
imminent danger, and that the plentiful and unbiased evidence of
Harvill's violent proclivities was sufficient to convince a reasonable
person that Harvill was on the attack just prior to the fatal shots. 3
ANTITRUST LITIGATION
In United States v. International Harvester Co. , 4 the Antitrust Di-
vision of the Justice Department brought an action alleging that a stock
purchase and manufacturing agreement between co-defendants Steiger
Tractor Company and International Harvester violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act.55 The agreement provided that Harvester would acquire
thirty-nine percent of Steiger's common stock and the right to place
three Harvester directors on Steiger's nine-man board. The agreement
also required that Steiger had to assemble four-wheel-drive tractors us-
ing certain components supplied by Harvester, that Harvester would
purchase certain minimum numbers of such tractors, and that Steiger
would make available to Harvester a maximum of forty-eight to fifty-
two percent of its annual production.
The Government claimed elimination of actual and potential com-
petition between Harvester and Steiger in the production and sale of
high-powered and four-wheel-drive farm tractors.56 The Government
also alleged that another effect of the agreement was a significant in-
crease in concentration of production and sale of such machines. A
third alleged effect was possible substantial lessening of competition in
50. Judges Wood and Campbell were sitting by designation.
51. 568 F.2d at 519.
52. The majority also held that admission of evidence that Rooney refused three times to
answer questions put to him by the arresting officer was not a violation of Rooney's fifth amend-
ment rights. Id. at 522.
53. Id. at 529.
54. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
56. Both sides stipulated that "four wheel drive farm tractors" was the relevant market. 564
F.2d at 772.
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production and sale of these machines. Although the court of appeals
agreed with the district court that the Government had made out a
prima facie case through a statistical showing of concentration, it held
that the lower court properly considered evidence of Steiger's "weak-
ness as a competitor.""7 The court of appeals noted that "the evidence
can be viewed as a showing that 'the market shares statistics give an
inaccurate account of the acquisitions, probable effects on competi-
tion.' "58 The rationale for admitting such evidence is that the govern-
ment's vast market statistics are insufficient to warrant a directed
finding because Steiger's weak financial reserves would not allow it to
be as strong a competitor as the bald statistical projections would indi-
cate. The court of appeals observed:
Even though the defendants do not rely on the failing-company doc-
trine, which is a valid defense to a Section 7 suit, they have shown
that even if Steiger remained in the market, it did not have sufficient
resources to compete effectively, and this supports the district court's
conclusion that the acquisition of 39 per cent of SteiAer's stock by
Harvester would not substantially lessen competition.
International Harvester is significant in that the Seventh Circuit has
joined the trend away from the strict statistical approach in section 7
cases advanced by Professor Turner' and enthusiastically applied by
the Warren Court in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank.6 '
MARITAL PRIVILEGE
In Ryan v. Commissioner,62 petitioners appealed from a decision of
the Tax Court holding them in contempt for refusing to answer seven
interrogatories propounded by the Commissioner. Ryan claimed that
the Tax Court improperly rejected their claims of fifth amendment
privilege and marital privilege.
In September 1969, the Ryans, who evidently were constant liti-
gants with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, filed a petition in
57. Id. at 773 (citing United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486, 503 (1974)).
58. Id. at 773 (citing United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120
(1975)).
59. 564 F.2d at 774 (citation omitted).
60. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 1313
(1965).
61. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
62. 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977). Accord, United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.
1978), where an agent's tape recording of a wife's statement that her husband had heroin stashed
in Mexico and would smuggle it into the country was admitted against the husband in a prosecu-
tion for narcotics smuggling. The Fifth Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh and Second Cir-
cuits, stating, "[Wie hold that conversations between husband and wife about crimes in which they
are jointly participating when the conversations occur. . . do not fall within the privilege's pro-
tection of confidential marital communications." 574 F.2d at 1381.
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Tax Court for redetermination of deficiencies of taxes assessed by the
Commissioner for the years 1958 through 1962, 1964 and 1965. The
Commissioner spent several years attempting to take depositions of
Swiss bank officials, during which time the Ryans filed a motion to
suppress and enjoin all proceedings, claiming that evidence had been
illegally derived from a grand jury investigation of petitioners. On
hearing, the Ryans claimed that federal agents had obtained damaging
information by abusing the grand jury process and by mounting illegal
searches and seizures of their papers. They served subpoenas on sev-
eral Internal Revenue agents, seeking information about illegal elec-
tronic surveillance. The Commissioner moved to quash, and the
hearing on this motion was continued until trial. When the new Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the United States Tax Court became effec-
tive in 1974, the Commissioner served seven interrogatories on the Ry-
ans. At the same time, the United States Attorney for the District of
Columbia obtained an order in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia granting the Ryans use immunity in exchange for
their testimony. They appealed that order. The appeal was dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that an immunity order is not a
final, appealable order. On remand of their appeal, the Ryans per-
sisted in their refusal to answer the interrogatories, asserting for the
first time a marital privilege.
On remand, the Tax Court held the Ryans in contempt for refusal
to obey an earlier order to answer the interrogatories, and imposed a
fine on the husband. The court reasoned that the Ryans had not estab-
lished a reasonable apprehension that they would be prosecuted be-
cause the proceeding itself was civil, and the statute of limitations had
run for the years involved. The Tax Court also rejected the Ryans'
claim of marital privilege on the ground that the privilege against ad-
verse spousal testimony is applicable only in criminal proceedings.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected the Ryans'
argument that the fact that the interrogatories may have been produced
by illegal government activities thereby excused the Ryans from an-
swering. Judge Marshall6" found that the proceeding sought to utilize
discovery procedures similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which maintain that any matter relevant to the subject matter of the
pending case may be the subject of discovery unless it is privileged.
Illegal government conduct, according to Judge Marshall, does not fall
within either of the two recognized limitations to the scope of discovery
63. Judge Marshall was sitting by designation.
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recognized in the rules-privilege and irrelevance.64
Furthermore, Tax Court Rule 70(d) provides that no information
obtained through discovery shall be considered as evidence until of-
fered and received as evidence. Therefore, answers to the interrogato-
ries could not be used against the Ryans unless they were
independently determined to be admissible. The Ryans' motion to
suppress could well take the answers out of the scope of admissibility;
thus, their objection was at best premature.65
The Ryans' fifth amendment argument was rejected on the ground
that the grant of immunity by the District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia was valid and coextensive with the scope of privilege, and
thereby obviated any question. In rejecting the Ryans' claim of mari-
tal privilege, Judge Marshall found Rule 504 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence 66 controlling.67  The determination of the existence of the
privilege is essentially a case-by-case analysis, balancing the need for
truth against the importance of the relationship or policies encouraged
by the privilege. The Ryans argued that in their case, the privilege was
necessary to avoid forcing one spouse to condemn the other's testi-
mony. As this argument stems from the fear that forcing one spouse to
speak against the other would be likely to destroy the marriage, the
argument was of little force here, since the Ryans had been married for
about forty years and did not even contend that the privilege was nec-
essary to protect their marriage.68  The court, relying on United States
v. Van Drunnen,69 found that the marital privilege should be limited to
instances in which the spouse who is neither a victim nor a participant
observes evidence of the other spouse's crime.
STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS
Hughes v. Mathews,7° an appeal from the grant of a writ of habeas
corpus to a state prisoner in Wisconsin, tested the constitutionality of
64. 568 F.2d at 538.
65. Id.
66. FED. R. EVID. 504 (1975).
67. 568 F.2d at 543 (citing [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7059).
68. See United States v. Doughty, 460 F.2d 1360 (7th Cir. 1972), in which the Seventh Cir-
cuit refused to extend the marital privilege against adverse spousal testimony when it was unlikely
that the privilege was necessary to further its underlying rationale.
69. 501 F.2d 1393, 1396 (7th Cir. 1974). While the Van Drunnen court recognized that the
underlying reason for the marital privilege against adverse spousal testimony is to preserve the
family, it was unable to find that the public interest in family preservation was strong enough to
justify assuring a criminal that he can enlist the aid of his spouse in a criminal enterprise without
fear that by recruiting an accomplice or co-conspirator he is creating another potential witness.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the privilege should be applied only to those cases where
the spouse was not a victim or participant.
70. 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978).
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Wisconsin criminal procedure and the Wisconsin statute relating to
first and second degree murder.7' Wisconsin had adopted that section
of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code dealing with the in-
sanity defense, which states that "A person is not responsible for crimi-
nal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease
or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrong-
fulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of
law."72 However, the Wisconsin legislature refused to pass the corol-
lary section of the Model Penal Code7 3 which allowed introduction of
evidence regarding mental disability whenever such evidence was rele-
vant to the state of mind of the defense. After the legislative enact-
ment, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Hughes, refused to admit
psychiatric testimony on the issue of intent during the guilt portion of
the bifurcated trial.74 The Seventh Circuit struck down Wisconsin's
version of the Model Penal Code on the ground that the statute, in
conjunction with decisional law, would presume intent where such an
inference could not be rebutted by psychiatric evidence that the de-
fendant lacked specific intent.
The Seventh Circuit cited Morrissette v. United States75 for the
proposition that "a conclusive presumption which relieves the state of
its duty to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
is, therefore, unconstitutional. 7 6  The court concluded that, in Wis-
consin, psychiatric testimony is relevant evidence on issues regarding a
defendant's mental state, including the question of whether the defend-
ant had the capacity to form specific, as opposed to general, intent--the
difference, in Wisconsin, between first and second degree murder.77
DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
United States v. Rose7" was a frivolous attack on the authenticity
of an apparent official record of the defendant's previous conviction.
Rose was convicted of unlawful receipt from a convicted felon of a
firearm which had moved in interstate commerce. He apparently
71. WIs. STAT. §§ 940.01, .02 (1975).
72. WIS. STAT. § 971.15(1) (1975).
73. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (Official draft, 1962).
74. A bifurcated trial is mandated by Wisconsin criminal procedure for defendants who
plead both not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.
75. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
76. 576 F.2d at 1254. The defendant in that case, who had broken into his former wife's
house and killed his former father-in-law, attempted to introduce testimony at trial that he was a
psychopath and that his abnormal condition prevented him from forming the specific intent to
kill.
77. Id. at 1257.
78. 562 F.2d 409 (7th Cit. 1977).
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sought to raise a "genuine claim of authenticity" under Rule 1003 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence79 by asserting that the court improperly
admitted his "booking record" from the Orange County, California
sheriff's office. The record set out the defendant's fingerprints and re-
cited the state felony charge of which Rose previously had been con-
victed. 0
The evidentiary infirmity, according to Rose, was that the photo-
copy of the original booking slip, substituted for the original at trial,
was inadequately identified. The original custodian's successor quali-
fied the document and testified, evidently from hearsay knowledge, that
the procedures currently used to prepare booking records were those
used by his predecessor.8 The court's analysis assumed that the book-
ing record was merely a business record admissible under Rule
803(6),82 rather than an official document controlled by the provisions
of Rule 1005.83 The court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Peter Ekrich
& Sons, Inc. v. Selected Meat Co. 4 where the court held that "the per-
son who makes the record need not testify."85 The court noted that
Rule 803(6) merely refers to the" 'custodian or other qualified witness,'
without any suggestion that the foundation for introduction of a record
must be laid by its maker."8 6  If the Government had laid a clear foun-
79. FED. R. EVID. 1003 (1975).
80. 562 F.2d at 410.
81. The Government apparently qualified the document pursuant to Rule 901(b)(7) by hav-
ing the custodian of the document testify to the source of the copy and to the methods used to
create it. Rule 901(b)(7) provides:
Evidence that a writing authorized by law to be recorded or filed and in fact re-
corded or filed in a public office, or a purported public record, report, statement or data
compilation, in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are kept.
82. FED. R. EVID. 803(b) (1975) provides:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events,
conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information
transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted
business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or
circuimstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as
used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation,
and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
83. FED. R. EVID. 1005 (1975) provides:
The contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or filed
and actually recorded or filed, including data compilations in any form, if otherwise
admissible, may be proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule 902 or
testified to be correct by a witness who has compared it with the original. If a copy
which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, then other evidence of the contents may be given.
"Official record" is construed broadly. In Yaitch v. United States, 283 F.2d 613, 616-17 (9th Cir.
1960), a Selective Service interdepartmental memorandum, part of defendant's file, was held to be
an official record.
84. 512 F-.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1975).
85. Id. at 1159.
86. Id.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
dation that the booking record was in fact an official document, the
custodian-witness need only have testified that he compared the copy
with the original in the sheriffs office and that the copy was correct.
8 7
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit's evidentiary decisions during the past year
emphasize the trend toward admissibility furthered-if not fos-
tered-by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The policy
favoring admissibility triumphs in cases involving "other act" evidence
where the evidence admitted is obviously prejudicial. This trend,
halted momentarily by the decision in Shapiro,8 could profitably be
slowed by a requirement that the "other acts" be closely related in kind
and time to the acts in issue.
87. FED. R. EvID. 1005. See United States v. Rodriguez, 524 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1975), cert
denied, 424 U.S. 972 (1976), where an agent testified that he made a photostatic copy of the vehi-
cle certificate of title. Although he was not asked directly whether it was a "correct" copy, even
the failure to testify to the contrary met the requirements of Rule 1005. Id. at 487-88.
88. See text accompanying notes 39-46 supra.
